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Abstract 
 
Decompositions of the world into systems have typically been regarded as arbitrary extra-
theoretical assumptions in discussions of quantum measurement.  One can instead regard 
decompositions as part of the theory, and ask what conditions they must satisfy for self-
consistency.  It is shown that self-consistent decompositions that specify a measurement 
context (i.e. von Neumann decompositions) must represent apparatus as containing 
internal decohering environments and as having known pointer components and ready 
states.  Under these circumstances a von Neumann decomposition can function as a 
component of the ready state of the observer.  Minimal no-collapse quantum mechanics 
supplemented by these consistency requirements on von Neumann decompositions 
avoids the measurement problem. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At the end of his now-classic “rough guide” to decoherence, W. Zurek [1] points out the 
critical role in the analysis of measurement that is played by the decomposition of the 
universe into interacting systems, and remarks that a principled understanding of the 
origin of such decompositions would be “most useful” (p. 1818).  It is the indeed the 
universal practice of physicists to choose whatever decompositions seem to offer 
advantage, and of human beings in general to draw conceptual boundaries around bits of 
the world, give them names, and consider them as entities, all with apparently complete 
freedom.  Such decompositions are, however, or if viewed as abstractions are at least 
represented by, physical states of those who employ them.  Hence they cannot be 
arbitrary: every instance of a decomposition is a projection, into some coordinate system 
that captures an observer’s cognitive activity, of the universal state vector ΨU, and as 
such must be producible by some physical process or other.   Zurek’s remark on the 
utility of understanding the origin of decompositions thus points, at least in part, to the 
evident utility of understanding the origins of and constraints on physical 
implementations of cognition.   
 
The present paper approaches Zurek’s question indirectly by focusing on a particular 
class of decompositions, the von Neumann decompositions that form the basis for the 
analyses of measurement interactions.  These decompositions divide the world into a 
system of interest (S), the states of which are unknown and are the target of the 
measurement, an apparatus (A), and embedding environment (E), and an observer (O).  
They represent the context of the measurement interaction from O’s point of view, and 
can be viewed as encoding O’s reportable knowledge of the both the context and the 
interaction.  This paper asks what information such a von Neumann decomposition 
{S,A,E,O} must contain to both adequately and consistently support the analysis of a 
measurement interaction.  It first shows that von Neumann decompositions that represent 
A as linearly coupled to S are not self-consistent, and that removing this inconsistency 
causes the measurement problem, as standardly conceived from the observer’s 
perspective, to disappear.  Second, it shows that in the context of a consistent von 
Neumann decomposition, einselection-based stability criteria that identify non-
destructively observable states [1, 2] are insufficient to identify pointer bases.  The 
attempt to recover the macroscopic world from einselection alone – the existential 
interpretation – therefore fails: einselection in effect yields a classical “scene” but no 
objects.  Finally, it shows that the information contained in a consistent von Neumann 
decomposition is the contextual information required to define the “ready” state of an 
observer.  This dynamic interpretation of the decomposition allows it to be represented as 
a data structure with a single argument – the specification of A – and reframes Zurek’s 
question in the special case of human observers as an empirical question that is not only 
addressable, but at this stage significantly answerable by neuroscience.  The paper closes 
by examining some implications of these three consequences of decompositional 
consistency for the interpretation of measurement, and by arguing in particular that 
minimal no-collapse quantum mechanics requires only self-consistency of von Neumann 
decompositions to avoid the measurement problem. 
 
Before proceeding, it is worth reviewing some of the intuitions that go into a von 
Neumann decomposition {S,A,E,O} and making them at least slightly more precise.   
First, the environment E is included in the decomposition to indicate explicitly that the 
universe lacks a priori boundaries that physically isolate quantum systems of interest; all 
real systems are open to some environment [1-6].  The environment E in a decomposition 
{S,A,E,O} comprises all degrees of freedom not explicitly allocated to S, A or O and is 
assumed to be large compared to any of these systems.  Moreover, the only states of E 
that are regarded as relevant to the measurement are those that linearly encode pointer 
values of A; all other environmental states are ignored.  Second, as noted above, a 
decomposition employed by an observer O to define the context of a measurement 
interaction must be represented by a physical state of O; this representation is what 
allows O to report what was measured as well as the result.  Hence a minimal condition 
on O is that its physical structure includes degrees of freedom sufficient to represent both 
the decomposition itself and the results obtained from measurements employing the 
decomposition.  The plural “results” is used here advisedly; a “measurement” that can be 
made once but never replicated may have poetic value, but is of little use in science.  This 
implies a minimal condition on A: the physical structure of A must be such as to allow its 
re-identification and hence re-use over time by O.  These conditions can be summarized 
by saying that E transmits but does not transform information, O represents the 
decomposition as well as the results, and A cannot be an unknown quantum state.  
Besides these conditions on its elements, a von Neumann decomposition involves three 
assumptions about couplings.  First, S is coupled to A, otherwise A would be irrelevant to 
the decomposition.  Second, the S-E and S-O interactions are negligible, otherwise S 
would be decohered by E before the measurement could be made, or O could obtain 
information about S directly without need of A.  Finally, A and O are coupled to E but 
not to each other, otherwise E would be irrelevant.  These coupling conditions can be 
summarized by saying that observers use apparatus to make measurements, they interact 
with their apparatus via ambient environmental media, and measurement only works if 
the apparatus being employed actually interacts with the system of interest. 
 
 
2. Decompositional consistency eliminates the observer’s measurement problem 
 
Following the analysis of Tegmark [3], it has become widely if not universally accepted 
that internal representational states – e.g. memories – in human brains, and by extension, 
equivalent internal structures of any other candidate observers, are fully decohered by the 
brain’s internal environment [2, 4 – 6].  While Tegmark proposes particular basis states – 
the resting versus firing states of action-potential generating neurons – as underlying 
internal cognitive representations, his analysis succeeds for any proposed decomposition 
of the brain in which the degrees of freedom to which an internal representational role is 
assigned interact sufficiently strongly with a sufficiently larger collection of degrees of 
freedom to which an internal representational role is not assigned.  Tegmark does not 
explicitly consider this case, but it is clear that his analysis applies not only to internal 
representational states directly consequent to perceptual input, but also to those that 
originate by internal processes, for example states representing novel theoretical ideas.  
While the details of the decoherence times estimated in Tegmark’s analysis may be 
questioned [7, 8], one significant consequence is clear: the external output states of 
human brains, and again by extension the equivalent external structures of any other 
candidate observers, are causal consequences of fully decohered internal states and are 
therefore of determinate content.  Thus even if one is inclined to argue that some internal 
cognitive processes briefly employ irreducibly quantum computation, there is no question 
but that outputs overtly reported by human observers, including outputs of purely internal 
cognitive processes, are fully decohered and thus effectively classical. 
 
As Tegmark [3] points out, internal decoherence is directly relevant to quantum 
computation.  It is the imbalance in the roles attributed to component degrees of freedom 
that makes decoherence such a problem for quantum computing: only a few degrees of 
freedom in any physically-realized quantum computer are interpreted as information-
bearing qubits; the rest compose a potentially-decohering internal environment.  This 
decohering internal environment cannot be dispensed with, as it is essential to the 
functioning of the device; it particular, it is essential to the process of measuring, and 
hence outputting, the data represented by the qubits.  Thus even though some internal 
processes are in this case explicitly acknowledged to involve irreducibly quantum 
computation, there is no question but that outputs overtly reported by any physically-
realized quantum computer are decohered and thus effectively classical. 
 
The basic structure of Tegmark’s [3] analysis of observers, and of quantum computers as 
a class of apparatus, would appear to apply to any physically-realizable apparatus; 
Tegmark’s analysis would appear to imply that any physically-realizable apparatus would 
incorporate an internal decohering environment, that the internal decohering environment 
would efficiently decohere any apparatus states that became entangled with quantum 
systems, and that any apparatus would therefore present a fully-decohered pointer state to 
the external environment.  However, prominent recent reviews of the role of decoherence 
in quantum measurement, all of which cite Tegmark’s analysis with approval, continue to 
represent the pointer state of the apparatus prior to interaction with the external 
environment E by a linear superposition Σi λi |si>|ai>, where the |si> are basis vectors for 
S and the |ai> are the pointer basis for A [4 – 6].   Such a linear representation, assuming 
more than one of the λi are non-zero, implies that the pointer state of A has not yet been 
decohered, i.e. that A does not incorporate a decohering internal environment.  This is 
confirmed by discussions of decoherence and einselection being imposed on A by the 
external environment, the environment E via which pointer states of A are observed by 
O.  While this approach accords with the pedagogical tradition of treating quantum 
systems first as closed and only later as open to E, Tegmark’s analysis raises the question 
of whether a linear representation of A is consistent with A being viewed as a physically-
realized apparatus that is employed in a measurement context.  It is therefore worth 
asking whether a linear representation of A is consistent with the assumptions and 
constraints of a von Neumann decomposition. 
 
Let us first consider the case (“Case 1”) in which A incorporates an internal decohering 
environment with which O does not interact.  In this case, S interacts with internal 
components of A, producing an entangled state |S>|Ainternal>.  This correlated state is 
decohered by the internal environment of A, which can be assumed without loss of 
generality to destroy |S>.  The resulting decohered state, which can be represented 
|Ad(internal)>, is correlated by A’s internal dynamics with a single pointer state |an>.  These 
internal dynamics are executed by the internal environment of A, but unlike that of the 
external environment E, the representation of the internal environment of A in a von 
Neumann decomposition is not restricted to the transfer of information only; thus A’s 
internal dynamics can be represented as non-trivial (i.e. energy dissipating and non-
linear), as indeed they are in the case of actual apparatus.  Provided that the resulting 
pointer state |an> commutes with the A-E interaction, it is encoded by a determinate 
environmental state |en>.  Up to considerations of classical noise, this state |en> transmits 
information only.  The observer “samples” |en> in the sense described by Zurek [1], i.e. 
interacts with |en> in a way that is effectively nondestructive.  Assuming that O 
associates |en> with |an> and that O’s internal representations are fully decohered by O’s 
internal environment, O is able to remember or externally report |an>.  This scenario is 
precisely that envisioned by designers of quantum computers and measurement 
apparatus, and is the most natural interpretation of experiments involving not only micro- 
but also meso- and macroscale quantum states [6, 9].  It can be consistently modeled by 
minimal no-collapse quantum mechanics, as it involves only virtual collapse – 
information loss to the internal environment – via internal decohering interactions.  The 
observer O is external to A, does not interact with A’s internal environment, and so is 
never faced with an environmental encoding of a superposition; hence from O’s 
perspective the measurement problem as traditionally conceived does not arise. 
 
The second, more traditional characterization of A involves two sub-cases, one in which 
A incorporates a decohering environment with which O does interact, and the other in 
which A incorporates no internal decohering environment.  The first of these sub-cases 
(“Case 2a”) is equivalent to a situation in which A is inter-penetrated by the external 
environment E; O’s access to the internal environment renders it continuous with E.  
Tegmark [3] explicitly employs a decomposition of this type, confining A to “the pointer 
position on the measuring apparatus” and relegating the remainder of the physical 
realization of the apparatus to the environment (p. 4196).  In this case, both the pointer 
states |ai> and the system state |S> are directly coupled only to E.  But E is large, so both 
the |ai> and |S> will be immediately decohered.  Because the |ai> and |S> are not directly 
coupled, the correlation Σi λi |si>|ai> is never established and the decohered pointer state 
|an> conveys no information about |S>.  Hence while this representation of A is adequate 
to discuss interactions between A and O – the purpose to which Tegmark puts it – it is 
inadequate to discuss O’s use of A to obtain information about S.  The measurement 
problem does not arise in this case because there is no measurement: no information 
about the state of S is available to O.  The intuitive notion of a von Neumann 
decomposition disallows this case by requiring that the S-E interaction be negligible for 
precisely this reason. 
 
The second traditional sub-case (“Case 2b”) involves an apparatus A that incorporates no 
internal decohering environment.  All degrees of freedom of A are therefore coupled 
directly to S; if any degrees of freedom of A existed that were not coupled directly to S, 
they would constitute an internal decohering environment, contrary to assumption.  One 
can view this situation in one of two ways.  If decoherence by the external environment is 
temporarily neglected, the correlated state Σi λi |si>|ai> is an isolated, unknown (by 
assumption, as S is assumed to be unknown) quantum state.  By the no-cloning theorem 
[10], it cannot be replicated; hence O cannot re-identify it by observation.  This is the 
situation envisioned in considerations of fully-linear measurement prior to the recognition 
that all real quantum systems are open; O was imagined to be directly coupled to this 
unknown quantum state, and hence to exist is a non-re-identifiable state Σi λi |oi>, giving 
rise to the measurement problem.  With the recognition that O is only directly coupled to 
E, this view is no longer tenable.  Decoherence by E must be taken into account, in which 
case since E is large, the correlated state ψ = Σi λi |si>|ai> must be regarded as 
immediately decohered.  The environmental encoding of this state, however, is 
problematic; the “pointer basis” that is encoded will be determined not by the E-A 
interaction HEA alone, but by the composition of HEA and the E-S interaction HES.  The 
latter interaction cannot be neglected, because it involves at least the degrees of freedom 
of the former.  There is no reason to assume that HAE and HES commute; indeed HES is in 
general unknown.  The observer is thus faced with an unknown and unknowable 
encoding state HEAHES(ψ) + HESHEA(ψ), where there is no guarantee and no reason to 
assume that HEAHES and HESHEA share eigenstates.  Such an encoding does not represent 
the pointer state of an apparatus; it has effectively replaced the original decomposition 
{S,A,E,O} with the ambiguous {SA,E,O}.  An observer with this latter decomposition 
can only be regarded as not knowing – i.e. not being able to report – what she is 
interacting with.  This is not a coherent description of measurement.  The problem here is 
clear: Case 2b decompositions, in which A is represented as having no internal 
decohering environment, are effectively treating S as both open (exposed to the external 
environment) and closed (linearly coupled to the |ai>).  They are not self-consistent. 
 
Because it is so facile to represent a Case 2b decomposition formally as a von Neumann 
chain Σi λi |si> → Σi λi |si>|ai> → Σi λi |si>|ai>|ei> → Σi λi |si>|ai>|ei>|oi>, it is worth 
reflecting on what this case entails in a context of a laboratory setting.  Suppose S is an 
energetic proton-proton collision, and O observes the collision via a detector array 
connected eventually to a computer screen.  In a Case 2b decomposition, everything 
except the multi-particle state immediately following the collision and the pixel 
excitations on the screen is considered part of the environment E, and E is restricted to 
the linear transmission, without modification, of information.  Hence the decomposition 
can be written {S,{|pi>},E,O}, where the |pi> are the possible pixel excitation states.  
This decomposition is represented by a physical state of O, and constitutes O’s 
knowledge of the experiment.  With this information, which includes none of what would 
ordinarily be considered a description of the detector and computer apparatus, O is 
expected to cope with an environmental encoding generated by the composition of the 
interactions between ambient photons and pixels on the one hand, and between an 
explosion of energetic particles and the rest of the local environment on the other.  These 
interactions are not separated by a decohering environment, but are directly coupled.  
Without knowing what the apparatus is – without knowing more than just the pointer 
states – and representing it as having some internal dynamics, O simply cannot do this.  
With a Case 2b decomposition, O is faced with far worse than the traditional problem of 
observing a superposition; she is faced with observing a superposition that she does not 
have the information to specify.  The von Neumann chain has broken down at step 3, 
because HES cannot be ignored.   
 
The three abstract cases and the Case 2b gedankenexperiment outlined above demonstrate 
two things.  First, the measurement problem as traditionally conceived, i.e. the problem 
of an observer potentially faced with the experience of a quantum superposition, does not 
arise in von Neumann decompositions in which the apparatus is represented self-
consistently.  It appears to arise in decompositions in which A is regarded as not 
incorporating an internal decohering environment, but these decompositions are not self-
consistent: they treat S as both open and closed.  Second, it is clear from the discussion of 
Case 2 that the idea of an “apparatus” comprising only a collection of pointer states is 
incoherent.  Such an “apparatus” cannot be coupled, in any self-consistent 
decomposition, to a system of interest S in a way that allows the acquisition and 
transmission of information about S; hence there is no sense in which the “pointer states” 
are states of an informative pointer.  The first of these conclusions vindicates Bohr’s 
insistence that apparatus be treated classically from within the decoherence program.  
The second provides a formal version of the experimentalist’s intuition that an apparatus 
must be more than just its pointer. 
 
There is, of course, a nagging concern here: the concern that the measurement problem 
has been closed up inside the apparatus with a simple dictum that because it no longer 
concerns O, it is no longer an issue.  Bacciagaluppi [11], for example, formulates the 
measurement problem in a way that is independent of the “experience” of the observer.  
This larger issue will be considered below; for now, it is enough to note that the 
measurement problem does not arise inside A.  Nothing inside A “experiences” a 
collapsing wave function; decohering interactions spread coherence information 
throughout the internal environment of A, but assuming that A dissipates sufficient 
energy, they will have negligible effect on its internal dynamics.  Indeed, from the 
perspective of any given component of A, the local internal environmental encoding of 
residual coherence from S will be indistinguishable from the local internal environmental 
encoding of residual coherence from other components of A; i.e. it will carry no 
information about S.  Such residual coherence will eventually leak out into the larger 
environment E.  From this point on, it becomes part of the observer-independent 
measurement problem as formulated by Bacciagaluppi, and becomes subject to further 
decoherence processes within E.  
 
 
3.  Stability criteria are insufficient to identify pointer bases 
 
The ability of observers to gather information about the world depends, in the existential 
interpretation [1, 2], on their ability to use stability criteria such as the predictability sieve 
to discover einselected pointer bases.  Stability criteria identify states that are non-
destructively observable (hereafter “NDO”); they approximate the commutivity criterion 
[|ai><ai|, HAE] = 0 for defining states |ai> that are NDO by an A-E interaction HAE.  Zurek 
[1, 2] presents these criteria in the context of a Case 2 decomposition in which A is 
identified with its pointer states |ai>; indeed, A is identified with the states that are found 
to be NDO by stability criteria, and which are then taken to be its pointer states.  As 
shown above, however, Case 2 decompositions are either inadequate to describe 
measurement (Case 2a) or inconsistent (Case 2b).  The question therefore naturally arises 
as to whether einselection is sufficient to identify pointer states in Case 1 decompositions, 
i.e. in the case of apparatus that are represented as having internal decohering 
environments with which O does not interact. 
 
This sufficiency question is equivalent to the question of whether all NDO states of an 
apparatus are pointer states, which is in turn equivalent to the question of whether A can 
be consistently represented, in the context of a von Neumann decomposition, as bounded 
against E solely by its pointer states.  A pointer state conveys information about the state 
of the measured system S; in the context of a Case 1 decomposition, it is an NDO state of 
A that is classically correlated with a determinate measured state of S by A’s internal 
dynamics, i.e. by its internal decohering environment.  The sufficiency question can 
therefore be further reformulated as the question of whether A can be consistently 
represented, in the context of a Case 1 von Neumann decomposition, as bounded against 
E solely by states that carry information about the state of S. 
 
Before proceeding formally, it is useful to consider an example.  Apparatus used to 
interact with quantum systems dissipate energy.  It is typically possible to turn them off.  
They therefore have an NDO state, typically the state of a switch or an indicator lamp, 
that encodes information about whether the apparatus is turned on, and hence whether it 
can be “ready” to make a measurement.  An observer needs to know whether an 
apparatus is ready, therefore the state that indicates readiness is an important part of the 
specification of A within a decomposition.  The state of the power indicator, however, 
does not in general encode any information about the state of S; it is relevant to the 
measurement outcome only as a gating condition.  Hence it is an NDO state that is not a 
pointer state.  For at least some apparatus, therefore, not all NDO states are pointer states, 
so stability criteria that identify NDO states are, at least for some apparatus, insufficient 
to identify pointer states.  
 
This example can clearly be generalized.  Any apparatus must have a state |Aready> such 
that the “pre-measurement” S-A interaction HSA: |S>|Aready> → |S>|Ainternal>.  An 
observer must reportably know what |Aready> is, and must be able to determine non-
destructively whether A is in this state.    The ready state does not, however, encode the 
state of S; A is in |Aready> before the interaction.  Therefore any A must be represented as 
having at least one NDO state, |Aready>, that is not a pointer state. 
 
The vast majority of NDO states of an apparatus must, however, be represented in a Case 
1 decomposition as not encoding any available information, whether about S or about 
measurement-relevant states of A.  Such states correspond to physical degrees of freedom 
that compose the boundary against E of the internal decohering environment of A.  The 
number of degrees of freedom in the internal decohering environment must be large 
compared to the number of states encoding observer-accessible information about either 
S or A, as the internal environment must be represented as decohering states of both these 
kinds.  The number of degrees of freedom exposed to E on the boundary of this internal 
environment scales as N/l, where N is the total number of degrees of freedom of A and l 
is a representative dimension of A.  The states corresponding to these boundary degrees 
of freedom must be NDO, because A must be re-identifiable over time by O.  They 
cannot, however, be represented as informative, because to do so would disallow their 
role as unmonitored sinks for coherence information. 
 
The uninformative NDO states required by a Case 1 representation of A correspond to the 
“uninteresting” states of the exterior of an apparatus, such as the states of its outer casing.  
These states must be accessible to observers for re-identifiability, but they are roundly 
ignored unless they change – unless, for example, someone has painted a big red “X” on 
an instrument’s casing.   A sudden change renders such states informative about A, not 
about S; they are not potential or redundant pointer states.  They must be included in a 
Case 1 decompositional specification of A because to exclude them would render the 
internal environment of A unbounded against E, and hence undefined.  But Case 1 
decompositions are the only consistent decompositions adequate to the description of 
measurement, so all self-consistent apparatus specifications must include NDO states that 
are not pointer states; indeed the majority of NDO states in a self-consistent apparatus 
specification are not pointer states.  Hence stability criteria that identify NDO states are 
insufficient to the identify pointer states, and therefore insufficient to identify the pointer 
basis. 
 
The above result indicates that a self-consistent specification of an apparatus A in the 
context of a decomposition {S,A,E,O} in which the states of S are unknown must 
incorporate a specification of A’s pointer basis.  The pointer basis cannot be discovered 
by observation unless the states of S are known independently, or a new decomposition is 
introduced that renders known internal states of A subject to manipulation.  This 
reasoning clearly applies equally to |Aready>, and to any other externally-accessible states 
that provide information relevant to measurement.  The scope of the result is, however, 
larger than this.  Let A represent any spatially bounded subset of the universe, and let P 
represent any proper component of A that has degrees of freedom on A’s boundary.  
Provided states of P do not exhaust the NDO states of A, P cannot be identified by 
stability criteria alone.  Information obtained via alternative decompositions that allow 
access to internal states of A, or to known external systems that interact with A are 
always necessary.  A key objective of the existential interpretation, the emergence of the 
appearance of a classical world by einselection alone, is therefore not feasible.  Distinct 
classical objects cannot be obtained by non-destructive observation alone without an 
infinite regress of decompositions.  This fundamental problem will be considered further 
below; for now it is enough to note that such an infinite regress cannot occur, so some 
knowledge not obtained through decomposition-mediated observation is required to 
produce the apparently classical world that we observe. 
 
 
4.  Decompositions function dynamically as ready states 
 
The two consequences of decompositional consistency outlined above reveal that von 
Neumann decompositions must have an information-rich structure that is somewhat 
surprising initially, but on reflection seems rather obvious.  A von Neumann 
decomposition describes a context in which a measurement is carried out by an observer 
using an apparatus.  It represents the apparatus A explicitly and in considerable detail: it 
specifies an observationally re-identifiable spatial boundary, a set of pointer states, a 
ready state, and an internal dynamics that correlates the pointer states with the states of 
systems with which A interacts.  In contrast, the decomposition specifies the system of 
interest S completely implicitly: S is whatever A is interpreted as interacting with, i.e. 
whatever is in fact correlated post-interaction with the observed pointer state.  The 
decomposition gives S a name, but it is merely a placeholder for this uncharacterized, 
result-producing system.  The decomposition specifies the environment E equally 
implicitly, as everything else bar the observer, with the sole caveat that states of E 
linearly encode boundary states of A, including the pointer states.  Finally, it specifies the 
observer O as a re-identifiable system that represents the decomposition.  The re-
identifiability of O is a requirement of the decomposition’s repeated utility; O or others 
must be able to compare results obtained by O, and hence must be able to re-identify O 
as a reporter of results. 
 
Given this characterization, the dynamic role of von Neumann decompositions in 
measurement becomes clear.  The observer, like the apparatus, must have a ready state: a 
state |Oready> such that the E-O interaction HEO: |E>|Oready> → |E>|Ointernal>, where 
|Ointernal> is processed by O’s internal dynamics into a reportable and rememberable 
result.  The contents of three of the bits in |Oready> are obvious: O must be “turned on” 
(i.e. aware), oriented toward the pointer of A (i.e. paying attention), and have sufficient 
available memory and processing capacity to store and process |Ointernal> (i.e. be 
energetically capable of making an observation).  The second of these bits of |Oready> 
refers explicitly to a decomposition; therefore some of the information specified by a 
decomposition must be available in the ready state.  A consideration of what a ready 
observer must be able to report in response to queries shows that all of the information in 
the von Neumann decomposition is in fact required in |Oready>.  An observer who could 
not report the observable boundary of A, the identity of A’s pointer, and the facts that A 
was ready, that A’s dynamics were coupled to S, that the local environment faithfully 
transmitted information, and that she herself knew these things would not be “ready” to 
make a measurement.  The internal dynamics of O must, moreover, have access to the 
information contained in the decomposition to compute inferences about the state of S 
from |E>, even if S is only described as being in “the state correlated with |an>” for some 
value |an> of A’s pointer.  Hence the requirement that decompositions are represented by 
physical states of observers is not merely a philosophical consequence of a “materialist” 
metaphysical stance; it is essential to understanding the measurement process in physical 
terms. 
 
It is now possible to advance a first part of an answer to Zurek’s [1] closing question: a 
von Neumann decomposition is all but three bits of the ready state of an observer.  It is a 
data structure in which, for a given observer, O is fixed, S and E are computed within the 
data structure, and A is a four-component free variable.  In this representation, Zurek’s 
question decomposes into two parts: 1) where does the data structure itself come from? 
and 2) where do the values of A come from?  These are not foundational questions: they 
are straightforward empirical questions about any identifiable class of observers.  These 
questions have yet to be fully answered in the case of human observers, but the basic 
contours of their answers are clear.  The first question falls to comparative functional 
neuroscience, and is answered by models of multi-component binding in high-level 
perceptual processing [12-17].  The second falls to developmental cognitive 
neuropsychology, and is answered by models of concept learning [18-20].  Such models 
must assume, as noted above, that the foundational concept of a distinct, manipulable 
three-dimensional object that persists through time cannot be inferred from observations 
alone and hence must be encoded by developmental mechanisms acting in earliest 
infancy; identification of the precise time and mechanism by which this concept emerges 
is an active area of research [21-24].   These neurofunctional, neurocomputational and 
cognitive models rely on experimentally-accessible nonlinear mechanisms sensitive to 
small details in both the genetics and the interaction histories of individual observers.  
They thus provide a basis for understanding the fundamental constraint that 
decompositions are not arbitrary. 
 
Zurek [2] distinguishes observers from “the rest of the universe” and in particular from 
apparatus on the basis of their being “aware of the content of their memory” later glossed 
by saying that “(T)heir information processing machinery ... can readily consult the 
content of their memory” (p. 759, italics in original).  The above considerations suggest 
that observers are also characterized by distinct memory contents: in particular, observers 
must remember, and their computational systems must access, von Neumann 
decompositions.  An observer ready state shares with an apparatus ready state the 
conditions of being turned on, being properly oriented, and having sufficient memory and 
processing resources; but while the history of an apparatus, e.g. the history of its 
construction, provides it with a particular information-processing structure, the history of 
an observer must provide it both with an information-processing structure and with re-
identifiable and re-usable representations that are required components of its ready state.  
Any apparatus reports results; observers are required to report results and the 
decompositions from which they were inferred. 
 
 
5.  Three questions of interpretation  
 
The concept of a consistent von Neumann decomposition developed above can now be 
applied to questions of interpretation.  Let us begin with the gedankenexperiment 
proposed by Zeh [25], in which “objects carrying some primitive form of ‘core 
consciousness’” are passed through a double-slit apparatus (p. 232).  Zeh clearly intends 
these “objects” to be observers; they are to have an “elementary awareness of their path 
through the slits.”  Observers must have ready states, ready states encode von Neumann 
decompositions, and von Neumann decompositions specify the parameters of apparatus 
and certain characteristics of both the environment and the observer.  The decomposition 
employed by Zeh’s observer is simplified in that there is no S of interest, only the double-
slit apparatus A.  The only interaction of interest is that between O and A, mediated by E; 
hence there are two Hamiltonians HEA and HEO that share environmental eigenstates.  
Zeh’s observer observes at least sporadically as it passes though the apparatus; hence it is 
interacting with the environment while “in flight.”   
 
From Zeh’s observer’s own perspective, it clearly cannot pass through both slits, as its 
von Neumann decomposition requires it to represent the slits (i.e. A) as re-identifiable 
over time by itself (i.e. by O), and itself as re-identifiable over time both by itself and by 
external observers.  From our external perspective, both Zeh’s observer and the slits are 
interacting with some environmental medium (i.e. E), and that environmental medium 
must have sufficient degrees of freedom to encode spatial information about the slits at a 
resolution sufficient to provide Zeh’s observer with path information.  For path 
information to be well defined for Zeh’s observer, these environmental degrees of 
freedom must, at minimum, be dense enough to decohere positional states of the slits; our 
perspective, by imposing an informational requirement at the scale of Zeh’s observer, 
must agree with Zeh’s observer’s perspective on this point.  But the slits are larger than 
Zeh’s observer, so a density of environmental degrees of freedom sufficient to decohere 
positional states of the slits is also sufficient to decohere positional states of Zeh’s 
observer.  Hence our perspective agrees with that of Zeh’s observer: neither of us reports 
that Zeh’s observer travelled through both slits. 
 
While Zeh’s gedankenexperiment explores the consequences of considering S to be an 
observer, Zurek’s [1, 2] concept of the environment as a “witness” to observations, and 
its extension to the notion that the universe U itself can be considered an observer that 
ultimately guarantees a world that appears classical [4], explores the consequences of 
considering E to be an observer.  These concepts can be interpreted trivially by noting 
that the universe contains multiple observers, and other observers form part of E from the 
perspective of any given O.  Zurek appears, however, to intend the more robust 
interpretation that E – and by extension U – functions effectively as an observer 
independently of any “ordinary” observers embedded in it.  This interpretation requires 
an analysis of the state of E under which it can be regarded as encoding a von Neumann 
decomposition.  In particular, it requires an analysis of E that reveals a bounded 
representation of an apparatus. 
 
Consider an experimental context in which a number of instrumentation components are 
visibly connected by cabling.  An observer makes measurements by interacting with the 
final component of the chain; suppose it is a computer screen.  This observer O encodes 
as part of her ready state a decomposition that specifies the complete set of component 
instruments as the apparatus A, and regards the rest of the universe (except for the 
implicitly specified system S) as the environment E.  Suppose now that O finds the 
results displayed on the computer screen perplexing, and hypothesizes that something is 
awry in the instrumentation set-up.  She proceeds to disconnect some cabling and observe 
the output from the Nth component instrument with an oscilloscope; let A’ represent the 
entire instrumentation array up to this Nth component.  If we treat the oscilloscope as part 
of O (this is no different from treating her glasses as part of O), then O’s new ready state 
encodes a new decomposition {S,A’,E’,O}, where E’ = E + (A – A’).  Let us consider 
the difference between E and E’.  First, the number of degrees of freedom of E’ is 
negligibly larger than that of E; E is the rest of the universe.  Second, E’ continues to 
encode the pointer state of A, even though the disconnection of some cabling may have 
changed the value of the pointer state.  Indeed if we consider the state of E’\(A – A’), that 
is, the state of the degrees of freedom of E’ that correspond to those of E, it is clear that 
nothing has changed except the encoding of the positions of O, the oscilloscope, and 
some cabling.  Hence whereas from O’s perspective a boundary has shifting – the 
boundary of the apparatus – from E’s perspective nothing has happened.  The physics at 
the A – E boundary has not changed; it is only O’s representation of the physics – that is, 
O’s ready state – that has changed.  
 
This gedankenexperiment of shifting the boundary of A can clearly be repeated 
arbitrarily, with O re-specifying A’ to be anything in the laboratory that she cares to look 
at, including anything inside any of the instruments.  Each re-specification of A changes 
O’s ready state, but none of them alter anything more than the states of previously-
encoded positions from the perspective of E.  In particular, no physical interaction on the 
originally-specified boundary between A and E is altered; coherence information and 
thermal noise continue to leak across this boundary exactly as before.  But for E to be 
regarded as representing A, some component of E’s state would have to change (as some 
component of O’s state must change) every time the boundary changes.  Hence E cannot 
be regarded as representing A, except in the trivial and implicit sense of saying that E’s 
entire state represents A by specifying it as U\E.  Even this trivial sense is unavailable if 
one attempts to consider U as representing A.  The concept of the environment as a 
witness must, therefore, be restricted to the notion that the environment is a witness for 
observers, that is, for entities that encode von Neumann decompositions as components 
of their ready states.  This notion simply re-states the fact that multiple observers can 
non-destructive access the same environmental encodings.  
 
With this clarification of the environment’s role as a witness, the observer-independent 
formulation of the measurement problem can be addressed.  Bacciagaluppi’s [11] 
statement of the observer-independent formulation in the traditional context of a 
measurement of electron spin is recent and prominent: “the composite of electron, 
apparatus and environment will be a sum of a state corresponding to the environment 
coupling to the apparatus coupling in turn to the value +1/2 for the spin, and of a state 
corresponding to the environment coupling to the apparatus coupling in turn to the value  
-1/2 for the spin. So again we cannot imagine what it would mean for the composite 
system to be described by such a sum” (Sect. 3.1).  In this formulation of the 
measurement problem, it is not the observer’s experience that is at issue, but rather the 
ability of an external theorist to explain “what is meant by” a physical state of affairs. 
 
Note first that the formulation above, were it meant to characterize an observer’s 
perspective on the measurement context, would involve a Case 2 decomposition and 
would therefore, by the analysis outlined in Sect. 2 above, be inconsistent as a description 
of measurement.  Any observer would characterize the electron’s state as decohered by 
the internal environment of the apparatus, and hence would characterize both the pointer 
state of the apparatus and its environmental encoding as determinate.  Hence this 
formulation can only be meant to characterize the measurement context as if no observer 
were present, i.e. independently of any decomposition.  The decomposition-independent 
perspective is, however, the perspective of the environment as discussed above.  The 
environment does not represent the electron, the apparatus, itself, or any of the 
interactions that Bacciagaluppi envisions; the environment only has a state.  Without 
assuming a decomposition, it is not even possible to say that this state is a non-trivial 
superposition, for doing so involves the imposition of a basis in which the state is not 
pure.  From a consistent decomposition-independent perspective, the only thing that can 
be said is that the environment – or the universe as a whole – is in some state.  This is not 
the statement of a problem; it is merely the statement of a fact. 
 
There is, therefore, no consistent observer-independent formulation of the measurement 
problem.  There only appears to be an observer-independent formulation of the 
measurement problem if one neglects the implicit decompositions built into the words 
“electron”, “apparatus”, and “environment”.  These words denote systems, and as Zurek 
[1] notes, without systems “the problem of measurement cannot even be stated” (p. 
1818).  In an environment that is simply regarded as full of interacting stuff, the 
measurement problem cannot even be stated. 
  
6.  Conclusions  
 
This paper has considered some consequences of viewing decompositions, and in 
particular von Neumann decompositions, not as arbitrary extra-theoretical assumptions 
but as physical states that encode the information that an observer must possess to 
perform, report and repeat measurements.  The primary consequence of this physical 
view of decompositions is that a system can only be self-consistently represented as a 
functioning apparatus, with the re-identifiability and information-encoding characteristics 
that such a representation implies, if it is represented as containing an internal 
environment that decoheres the states of any of its components that are directly coupled 
to a quantum system of interest in the course of the measurement.  This constraint forces 
a hard choice: a system can be consistently represented either as linearly coupled to a 
quantum system (i.e. as being in a quantum superposition) or as functioning as an 
apparatus with which an observer can repeatably interact, but not both.  The traditional 
von Neumann chain that transfers quantum coherence linearly from the system through 
the apparatus into the environment and eventually to the observer is not a self-consistent 
representation of measurement.  The measurement problem cannot, on pain of 
inconsistency, arise from the perspective of either the observer or the environment.  The 
measurement problem is an artifact of an inconsistent description of a physical object as 
both linearly coupled to a quantum system and as functioning as an apparatus. 
 
The analysis put forward in this paper does not question or challenge the validity of 
minimal no-collapse quantum mechanics in any way.  It does not interpret quantum 
mechanics.  It merely imposes a constraint: decompositions describing measurement 
interactions must represent apparatus as containing internal decohering environments.  
All practical descriptions of apparatus, quantum computers, and cognitive systems of 
observers already satisfy this constraint.  It is only descriptions employed pedagogically 
and in foundational and philosophical discussions that fail to satisfy it.  The analysis put 
forward in this paper demotivates, by deconstructing the measurement problem, 
interpretive constructs such as Everett branches or extra-quantum mechanical collapse 
mechanisms, and arguments that quantum mechanics somehow requires special causal 
roles for consciousness or free will.  On the other hand, it motivates the view that 
measurement can be fully described purely in terms of known physics and unproblematic 
assumptions concerning the interaction histories of observers.  It proposes to begin this 
description with a characterization of von Neumann decompositions as experimentally-
accessible components of the ready states of observers.   
 
From a philosophical perspective, what the present analysis points out is that distinctions 
must be made between a chunk of the universe, that chunk of the universe bounded by 
the use of a name, noun, mathematical symbol, or description, and that chunk of the 
universe named or indicated in a way that presumes or assigns a function or other 
characteristic.  Names impose boundaries, and boundaries implicitly specify remainders 
or “environments” that are not what is under discussion, and which therefore do not have 
to be attended to in detail.  Not attending to something in detail is the information-
theoretic formulation of decoherence: coherence information is “lost” only because we 
have agreed to ignore it when we agree to a name and hence to the boundary of an 
environment.  Failure to draw these distinctions leads to failure to notice that merely 
bounding an electron as a particle forces it to be described as having a position, bounding 
the interacting stuff in a rectangular region of space as a visually re-identifiable thing 
forces it to be described as a macroscopic object, and calling such a bounded thing an 
apparatus forces it to be described as having a repeatably informative function.  But this 
point about language does not have anything to do with quantum mechanics; it has been 
discussed at least since Heraclitus.  Quantum mechanics is just particularly vulnerable to 
the unfortunate consequences of not bearing these distinctions in mind.   
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